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The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After,
Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative
History
STAUGHTON LYND*
When a union has been recognized as a collective bargaining rep-
resentative, do rank-and-file workers have the right to engage in con-
certed activity without the union's approval? Working people them-
selves do not know.1 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
seems straightforwardly to protect "the right . . . to engage in...
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ... *"2 However, the typical union contract
prohibits strikes for the duration of the agreement. Experience teaches,
moreover, that workers who leaflet, picket, or strike without union ap-
proval are likely to be discharged. The result is what in other contexts
has been called a chilling of protected rights. Not knowing what is pro-
tected and what is not, most workers keep their heads down and avoid
making waves.
The right to concerted activity for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection has been described by the United States
Supreme Court as a "fundamental right."' But it is unclear what this
means. Outside the workplace, in the larger society, designation of a.
right as "fundamental" means that state action to abridge or deny the
right must substantially justify itself. If this were what fundamental
rights meant inside the workplace, when union members leafleted,
picketed, or went on strike, their activity would be presumed to be pro-
tected by law, even if not approved by the union. The burden would
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I See the interviews collected in RANK AND FILE: PERSONAL HISTORmS By ,VoRK-
ING-CLASS ORGANIZERS (A. Lynd & S. Lynd eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as RANK AND
FILE]. Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer---"Pro-
tected" Concerted Activities, 47 TExAs L. REv. 378 (1969), argues that an employee
should not be discharged for concerted activity unless the employee knew or should have
known that the activity was unprotected.
229 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
a NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
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be on whoever wished to stop the concerted activity to show what
statute or contract language forbade it.
Until recently, the Supreme Court by and large presumed con-
certed activity to be protected, although often, in specific cases, finding
the presumption rebutted. A company rule which prohibited leafleting
on company property outside of working hours'was "presumed to be an
unreasonable impediment to self-organization."4 Peaceful picketing was
presumed to be protected unless expressly prohibited. The Court de-
clared:
The detailed prescription of a procedure ior restraint of
specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other picket-
ing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For
the policy of the national Labor Management Relations Act is
not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by its pre-
scribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is
implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom
of labor to use the weapon of picketing ..
Even strikes, despite their disruption of production, were until
recently presumed to be protected. The Court found some kinds of
strike action to be per se exceptions to the rule.6 The Court also rec-
ognized that a union could waive the right to strike during the life of
a collective bargaining agreement by explicit contractual provision. But
the Court held that, unless the waiver was clear and explicit, "the affir-
mative emphasis that is placed by the Act upon freedom of concerted
action and freedom of choice of representatives"' should cause ambi-
guity to be resolved in favor of the right to strike "against unlawful
practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining
SRepublic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n.10, 804 (1945).
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953). The importance of the
Garner formulation is emphasized in Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1337, 1345 (1972), and Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reailr-
nation of Garmon, 72 COLUm. L. REv. 469, 478 (1972). The Supreme Court itself re-
affirmed Garner as late as NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
62-63 (1964):
Congress has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing except where
it is used as a means to achieve specific ends which experience has shown are
undesirable. . . . We have recognized this congressional practice and have not
ascribed to Congress a purpose to outlaw peaceful picketing unless "there is the
clearest indication in the legislative history" . . . .
Even during the period when it was most protective of concerted activities, the
Supreme Court withdrew protection from sit-down strikes, NLRB v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), and from "quiidde' strikes, International Union,
UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). See text accompany-
ing note 82 in fra.
7Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 287 (1956).
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must rest."8
Lately, however, the Court appears to have adopted the position
that when a union has been recognized, concerted activity without union
approval is presumed to be unprotected. Ambiguity as to the right to
strike is now resolved by a presumption of arbitrability.9 Even workera
who strike because of what they believe to be abnormally dangerous
conditions, under the apparent shelter of section 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, must be prepared to produce objective
evidence of the danger or face discharge.' The right to leaflet about
the choice of a bargaining representative continues to be protected.1
But the Supreme Court, in the recent Emporium Capwel12 case, has
held that once a representative has been chosen, peaceful picketing and
leaflet distribution may be cause for discharge if the protesters demand
to talk with management, thus bypassing the union.
The Emporium Capwell decision is a particularly disturbing one.
Peaceful picketing is the most elemental form of protest available to
working people. The protesters in that case picketed on their own time,
without violence, and without obstructing the entrances to their work-
place."' Emporium Capwell seems to say that concerted activity which
8Id. at 281.
OUSW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); Boys
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
10 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). Section 502 of the LMRA
states: "[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such
employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
The Court found that section 502 did not limit the arbitration clause in the contract, and
that that clause gave rise to an implied no-strike clause.
"NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
3.2Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
is For the facts in the Emporium case, see The Emporium & Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Western Addition Community
Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Emporium Capwell Com-
pany operated a department store in San Francisco. The company had a collective bar-
gaining agreement with the Department Store Employees Union. In April 1968, a group
of employees covered by the agreement (one of the two men subsquently fired was not a
member of the union) met with the secretary-treasurer of the union to present a list of
grievances including a claim that the company was discriminating on the basis of race
in making assignments and promotions. The union pursued the claim. At a meeting in
September 1968 attended by union officers, employees, and representatives of the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment Practices Committee and the local antipoverty agency, the sec-
retary-treasurer announced that the union had concluded that the company was discrimin-
ating, and that it would process every such grievance through to arbitration if necessary.
Some of the employees present suggested that the grievance procedure was inadequate
to deal with a pattern of discrimination, and advocated that the union instead begin
picketing the store in protest. The union spokesmen disagreed. In October 1968, several
of the dissident employees held a press conference where they denounced the store's em-
ployment policy as racist, expressed their desire to deal directly with top management, and
[Vol. 50:720
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was protected before union recognition becomes tnprotected because
of the mere presence of a recognized union.
So fundamental a departure from the seeming intent of section 7
of the NLRA should be carefully scrutinized. The obvious first step
is to look again at the text of the Act.
The text of the National Labor Relations Act does not mandate a
clear choice between a presumption of protection or a presumption of
illegitimacy for concerted activities without the union's approval.
Section 7, as previously quoted, establishes a prima facie case for
protectedness. It does not distinguish between the rights of employees
before union recognition and the rights of employees after union
recognition. 4 It affirms, as the courts have recognized, not only a
right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of collective
bargaining but a second, separate right to concerted activity for the
purpose of other mutual aid or protection."5
The protection extended by section 7 is arguably withdrawn by
section 9 (a). That section states:
Representatives designated or selected for the jurposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purpo es of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment. . .. 6
It has been forcefully contended that the logical implication of section
9(a), in the context of the national labor policy, is that after a union
has been recognized as a collective bargaining representative, concerted
announced their intention to picket and to distribute leaflets calling for a consumer boy-
cott. When two of them did so they were fired.
14 Sections 7 and 8 [of the National Labor Relations Act] together bespeak a
strong purpose of Congress to leave workers wholly free to determine in what
concerted labor activities they will engage or decline to enga , e. This freedom of
workers to go their own way in this field, completely unhampered by pressures
of employers or unions, is and always has been a basic purpose of the labor legis-
lation now under consideration. In my judgment it ill betooves this Court to
strike so diligently to defeat this unequivocally declared parpose of Congress,
merely because the Court believes that too much freedom oi' choice for workers
will impair the effective power of unions.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 216 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
25 The independent right to concerted activity for mutual aid or protection has been
recognized even by courts which hold that the right should not be protected after union
recognition. "[S]ection 7 . . . specifically protects both the rig 4t to bargain collectively
and the right to engage in other concerted activities and specificaelly distinguishes between
the purpose of collective bargaining and the purpose of other mutual aid or protection."
NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965).
'129 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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activity should be channelled through the union and should be per-
mitted only with union approval."
However, section 9(a) contains a proviso which has been part of
that section since the original passage of the National Labor Relations
Act, and was strengthened when the Act was amended in 1947. The
proviso reads:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the inter-
vention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided furthter, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.' 8
This proviso can be understood not only to give rank-and-file workers-
a right to settle grievances directly with their employer, but also to
legitimize reasonable concerted activities in support of those griev-
ances.3
9
Not surprisingly, the uncertainty inherent in these contrapuntal
passages has driven decisionmakers to review the legislative history.0
Where did the language about concerted activities originate, and how
was it initially understood? How were concerted activities, thus under-
17 [W]ildcat strikes . . .are . . . acts of treason. . . . [W]e need not waste
too much sympathy upon the worker who acts to destroy his union. He should
be free to agitate for changes in union law, but when the law is made he should
become the law-abiding citizen in the legal entity or go elsewhere.
Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 826, 831
(1954). See also Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. Rev. 1195, 1242-48 (1967) ; Comment, Exclu-
sive Representation and the Right of Employees to Engage in Concerted Activity-Con-
flicting Policies of the NLRA, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 354 (1970).
In Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Indi-
vidual Workers: Should Exclushivity Be Abolished?, 123 J. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975), the
author proposes the converse: that since exclusivity hems in and oppresses individual
workers in a variety of ways, Congress should consider doing away with it altogether.
The point of view suggested by the legislative history lies between these two extremes.
Both in 1935, see text accompanying notes 25-77 infra, and in 1947, see text accompany-
ing notes 78-122 infra, Congress envisioned a system in which the recognized union has
exclusive authority to negotiate periodic collective bargaining agreements, but in which,
between contract negotiations, individual workers and small groups of workers have con-
siderable freedom to act for themselves in adjusting particular problems. For a similar
view, see Cassel, The Emporium Case: Title VII Rights and the Collective Bargaining
Process, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1347 (1975).
18 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (italics in original).
10 "Section 7 of the Act is designed to guarantee to employees the fundamental right
to present grievances to their employer to secure better terms and conditions of employ-
ment, even if the presentation of a grievance requires a work stoppage . . . " Hugh
H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (3d Cir. 1969). "'The language of
[Vol. 50:720
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stood, conceived to be qualified or limited by making the representatives
supported by a majority of the employees the exclusive representa-
tives for collective bargaining purposes? And in what way did Con-
gress in turn seek to modify majority rule by the proviso to section
9(a) ?
The Court's own answers to these problems in legislative history
are reasonably clear. The labor laws of the 1930's, in the Court's
view, were mainly intended to help working people to organize unions.
But
[a]s labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward
maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the
nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bar-
gaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolu-
tion of industrial disputes.2'
Since the end of World War II the purpose of national labor policy
has changed, the Court believes. The more recent labor statutes pro-
mote a policy of minimizing industrial strife through contract obser-
vance and arbitration, so the Court thinks.
The Emporium Capwell decision summarizes this reading of the
legislative history, and expressly relies on it. In Emporium Capwell,
the Court makes the following key assertions about legislative history:
1. "[Section 7 rights] are, for the most part, collective rights,
rights to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected
§7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take place before, after,
-or at the same time such a demand is made."' Id. at 1349 n.9, quoting NLRB v. Wash-
ington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). In Washington Aluminum there was no
recognized union. However, both Schatzki, supra note 1, at 378 n.3, and Getman, supra
note 17, at 1245 n.198, call attention to NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477 (1960), wherein the Supreme Court held that it was not a refusal to bargain for a
union to leaflet, picket, and engage in various forms of slowdoan, at the same time that
it was negotiating a new contract. It would seem to follow that ato whatever extent
rank-and-file workers are protected in settling grievances with their employer after a
union is recognized, they are also protected in supporting their demands with concerted
activity.
For rich descriptions of the way in which rank-and-file workers expand the meaning
of the collective bargaining agreement by informal pressure from below, see Atleson,
Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Functions of Industrial
Civil Disobedience, 34 Onio ST. LJ. 750, 790-92 (1973); Wdr, The Informal Work
Group, in RANK AND FiLE, supra note 1, at 179, 196-200.
20 See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.. 319, 332-33
(1951): "[N]o provision of the Act supplies a standard by which the choice can be
made" as to how much concerted activity independent of a recognized union should be
permitted.
21Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 393 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
This passage has become a staple in subsequent decisions restricting the freedom of ac-
tion of individual employees. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire , 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843
n.15 (1971) ; Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974).
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not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor
policy of minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining.' 29 U.S.C. § 151." '22
2. "Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where
the employees elect that course, is the principle of majority rule ...
'The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to
order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested
in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees.' ""
3. "The intendment of the proviso [to Section 9(a)] is to permit
employees to present grievances and to authorize the employer to en-
tertain them without opening itself to liability for dealing directly with
employees in derogation of the duty to bargain only with the exclu-
sive bargaining representative, a violation of §8(a) (5).""
So far as section 7 rights are concerned, the Court's reading of
the legislative history might be termed the Extinction Theory. Self-
government in the workplace, like self-government in the larger society,
requires the individual to give up certain rights so that other rights
may be more securely protected. The great questions inside the shop
just as outside it are: Is the surrender of rights voluntary? Which
rights may be, or must be, given up? Are rights surrendered once and
for all, or may they be reclaimed if the government to which they are
surrendered-here, the union government-forfeits its trust? In Em-
porium Capwell, as in other recent cases, the Supreme Court takes the
position that the selection of a bargaining representative extinguishes
the rights of individuals to take direct action on their own behalf.
The Court asserts that this is what Congress intended. Even if it
were, a question would remain as to whether the persons thus deprivect
of their rights ever consented to the surrender, and if not, what au-
thority the resulting arrangements should have. But it is unnecessary
to reach that question, for, as the following pages seek to show, the
Court's reading of legislative history is wrong.
I. RIGHTS PROTECTED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE
[Section 7 rights] are, for the most part, collective rights, rights
to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected
not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor
policy of minimizing industrial strife "by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 151.25
2 2 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
28 Id. at 62-63, quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
24 Id. at 61 n.12.
25 Id. at 62.
[Vol. 50:720
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The heart of section 7, the phrase "concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"
did not originate as part of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) of 1935. The phrase first made its appearance as part of the
statement of public policy in section 2 of the anti-injunction bill re-
ported to the United States Senate by its Judiciary Committee on May
26, 1928. The bill, including this phrase, was eracted substantially
unchanged in 1932 as the Norris-La Guardia Act.2"
Amid much that has changed, these words have stood for 50 years
as a definition of national labor policy. Congress has repeatedly seen
fit to use the same phrase to describe the rights of employees. The
language was also adopted by the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933,28 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,29 and the-Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)." Likewise the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffim Act)
begins with the words:
The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues
to be the responsibility of the Federal Government to protect em-
ployees' rights to organize, choose their own iepriesntatives,
bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities
for their mutual aid or protection. .... "-
The natural inference is that the rights described by the phrase are
indeed thought to be fundamental and to continue substantially un-
changed in different phases of labor activity.
The rights protected by the Norris-La Guardia Act were intended
to be protected whether exercised by a single individual or by a group.
Section 2, the statement of public policy, was framed with great care
by the draftsmen, Professors Frankfurter, Sayre, Oliphant, and Witte,
together with labor attorney Donald Richberg. 2 Section 2 was in-
26 69 CONG. REc. 10,050-51 (1928).
27 29 US.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
28 Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat 195.
2929 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1970).
30 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
a'Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1939, 29 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(1970).82 Donald Richberg told the House Judiciary Committee in 1932 that section 2 of
the Norris-La Guardia Act embodied two principles, "both of which have been written
into the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States." The first was the prin-
ciple that under modern industrial conditions the single employee is helpless to exercise
freedom of contract, and can do so only through a union. As to this principle, Richberg
cited the words of Chief Justice Taft in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council,
257 U.S. 184 (1921). The second principle embodied in section 2, according to Richberg,
was the principle that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. This principle was enunciated in the
1975]
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tended by the draftsmen and by the congressional sponsors, Senator
Norris and Congressman La Guardia, to avoid the judicial evisceration
which had befallen the Clayton Act.8 Section 2 states that "under pre-
vailing economic conditions, . . . the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor," and that he should have "full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing. . .. ""
Moreover, section 4 of the Act lists a series of activities which no
federal court may prohibit "any person or persons" from doing "whether
singly or in concert."85 The expression "concerted activities" in sec-
tion 2 should be understood to include at least the activities enumerated
in section 4 The courts have viewed the two sections in this way. "Sec-
tion 4," one commentator wrote, "has been used as a guide to discover
the activities which Congress particularly wished to shield from in-
junctive relief."3
Prior to the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act, Congress had
sometimes extended rights to individuals which it had denied to em-
ployees acting in concert. Thus the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was
deliberately phrased to protect the right of individual employees, but
Railway Labor Act of 1926 and endorsed by the Supreme Court (after the anti-injunction
bill was drafted) in Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930). Hearings on H.R. 5315 Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1932). Neither source refers to concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection, however. Section 3 of an anti-injunction bill sub-
mitted to the Massachusetts legislature in 1929 referred to "strike, lockout, or other con-
certed action" (see Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 682, 698 (1930)), but ob-
viously a 1929 bill was not the source of a phrase in a bill drafted in 1928.
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970). See Frankfurter & Greene, Labor Injunctions and
Federal Legislation, 42 HARv. L. REv. 766 (1929), reprinted in F. FRANKFtFRTER & N.
GREEN, THE LA0oR INJUxcriON 206 (1930); Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional
Power over the Labor Injunction, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 385, 395 (1931) ; Witte, The Fed-
eral Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. Rxv. 638, 645 (1932); S. REP. No. 163, pt. 1, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1932) ; H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1932) ; 75 CoNG.
Rc. 4503-04 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Norris).
34 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). There is a general similarity between this statement of
public policy in the Norris-La Guardia Act and 29 U.S.C. § 151, the statement of public
policy in the National Labor Relations Act, quoted by the Supreme Court in the passage
from Emporium Capwell at the beginning of this section. There is also an important
difference between the two statements. Whereas 29 U.S.C. § 151 begins and ends with
sentences which extol "the procedure of collective bargaining," the emphasis in 29 U.S.C.
§ 102 is more broadly on "self-organization," including organization for collective bar-
gaining.
3729 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). The expression "any person" is also used in subsections
(c), (d), and (g). Subsection (b) refers to becoming or remaining "a member" of a
labor organization.
86 Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary
Role of Norris-La Guardia, 70 YLE L.J. 70, 95 (1960).
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not the right of employees en masse, to quit work 3 The Norris-La
Guardia Act extended such rights to employees in groups without
ceasing to protect their exercise by individuals
Emporium Capwell is mistaken in asserting that the rights to
concerted activity were not protected for their own sake, but only for
their instrumental function in promoting collective targaining. Picket-
ing, in particular, was conceptualized as protected speech.
Section 4(e) of the Norris-La Guardia Act89 shields from injunction
"[g]iving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any
other method not involving fraud or violence . . ." Section 4(e)
was an object of controversy during the four-year incubation of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, and was included in the b dl as enacted with
particular deliberation. In an attempt to delegitimize mass picketing,
the majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee at one point succeeded
in striking from the bill all of section 4(e) after the words "labor dis-
pute."'" The offending language was later restored. In 1932, an at-
tempt was made on the Senate floor to substitute for the present sec-
tion 4(e) the language: "Giving fair publicity to the existence of, or
the facts involved in, such dispute." The amendment was defeated,
53-16."l
Something of the passion which accrued to this struggle over the
right to picket is suggested by the committee report 2 submitted to-
gether with the final version of the Norris-La Guardi'a Act on February
4, 1932. The report condemned an injunction issued by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, on March
29, 1930. The injunction was directed at picketing to publicize the
37The Railway Labor Act stated in part: "[Niothing in th.s chapter shall be con-
strued to require an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent,
nor shall anything in this chapter be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an
individual employee an illegal act . . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 152(10) (1970). Explicating
this clause, the Supreme Court quoted the report of the Senate committee, S. REP. No.
222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926), according to which the word "individual" had been
inserted before the word "employee" throughout the proviso to rke clear that the words
were not intended to apply to "combinations, conspiracies, or grotip actions." The Court
concluded: "The purpose of this limitation was manifestly to protect the individual lib-
erty of employees and not to affect proceedings in case of combinations or group action."
Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerk 3, 281 U.S. 548, 566-67,
567 n.4 (1930).
88 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
39 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1970).
40 S. REp. No. 1060, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). See also S. Doc. No. 327, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1931).
"175 CONG. Rc. 4767-71 (1932).
42S. REP. No. 163, pt. 1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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existence of a strike. The injunction forbade
printing, publishing, issuing, circulating, and distributing, or other-
wise communicating, directly or indirectly, in writing or verbally
to any person, association of persons, or corporation, any statement
or notice of any kind or character whatsoever, stating or represent-
ing. . . [that] there is a strike. . ..
The committee report summarized: "In other words, their mouths
were absolutely closed and 'free speech' was forbidden."" Referring
to the same injunction on the Senate floor, Senator Norris stated that
it absolutely and completely denied "the fundamental right of human
liberty and freedom," and that a worker who disobeyed it "would be
doing only what every human being has a right to do!""
The Supreme Court stated correctly in 1938 that Congress, in
protecting peaceful picketing by the Norris-La Guardia Act, intended
to protect the "peaceful and orderly dissemination of information"
and the opportunity "peacefully to persuade others to concurs' in one's
views."
The National Labor Relations Act intended no change in the
understanding of concerted activities. Throughout the legislative his-
tory of the Act, it was assumed that the concerted activities protected
by the new law were the same that were protected by the Norris-La
Guardia Act. The committee report submitted together with the first
draft of the bill expressly declared that section 4 (which in later drafts
became section 7)
restates the familiar law already enacted by Congress in section
2 of the Norris-La Guardia Act [and other statutes] . . . . The
language restrains employers from attempting by interference
or coercion to impair the exercise by employees of rights which
are admitted everywhere to be the basis of irndustrial no less than
political democracy. A worker in the field of industry, like a
citizen in the field of government, ought to be free to form or join
organizations, to designate representatives, and to engage in con-
certed activities. 47
4Id. at 17.
441d.
4575 CONG. REc. 4507 (1932).
46 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 562-63 (1938).
47S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVn
HIsToRY OF THE NATiONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 1099, 1103 (1949) [herein-
after cited as LEGISLATIVE HisToRY 1935]. See also 79 CONG. REc. 2371, 7569 (1935)
(remarks of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATV E HISTORY 1935, at 1312, 2 id. 2332;
Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATiVE HisToRY
1935, at 1414.
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This authoritative exposition of the National Lator Relations Act,
even more clearly than the report which accompanied the Norris-La
Guardia Act, thus analogized section 7 rights to the rights outside the
workplace protected-and surely for their own sake-by the first amend-
ment.
The legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act, in
fact, displays a persistent concern that section 7 rights not be diminished
by other features of the Act which promote collective bargaining. Sec-
tion 4 of the first draft stated: "Employees shall have the right to
organize and join labor organizations, and to engage in concerted ac-
tivities, either in labor organizations or otherwise . *.". . , Section
13"o of the Act was anticipated by a portion of Public Resolution 44,
enacted in June 1934 as a temporary substitute for a new labor law:
"Nothing in this resolution shall prevent or impede or diminish in any
way the right of employees to strike or engage in other concerted
activities.""0
The framers of the National Labor Relations Act not only ex-
plicitly protected the right to strike but also explicitly rejected the
necessity of arbitration. Initially this was not at all clear. On March
1, 1934, Senator Wagner told the Senate that his new bill was
modelled on the Railway Labor Act," which heavily stressed arbitra-
tion and correspondingly restricted the right to strike. "The National
Labor Board . . . ." the Senator continued, "is not designed to act
chiefly as a policeman or a judge. Its chief function will be to mediate
and conciliate industrial disputes, and to offer its servkes as an arbitrator
whenever the parties so desire." 2 Accordingly, the 1934 version of
what became the Wagner Act contained a lengthy section 206, begin-
ning:
The Board shall have power to act as arbitrator in labor dis-
putes. When any of the parties to a labor dispute agree to sub-
mit the whole or any part thereof to the arbitration of the Board,
48 S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935,
at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
49 Section 13 of the Act as originally enacted stated: "Nothing in this Act shall be
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any vay the right to strike."
Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 457, now incorporated in subst'-ce in the LMRA of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
50 H.R.J. Res. 375, ch. 67, § 6, 48 Stat. 1183 (June 19, 1934), 1eprinted in 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HisToRY 1935, at 1256. Section 6 was added to the resolution at the motion of Sena-
tor Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin. See I. BERNSTEiN, THE NTEW DEAL COLLECrIV
BARGAINING POLICY 80-81 (1950).
'78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIST'rORY 1935, at 17.
F2 Id. at 3443-44, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIW HISTORY 1935, at 17.
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and the Board accepts such submission, the agreement shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable as to the submitting parties
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. in any case accepted by it for arbitra-
tion the Board shall have power to issue an award applicable to
the submitting parties. 3
Workers were the first to protect section 206. Thus George
Powers, a steelworker at the Bethlehem mill in Sparrows. Point, Mary-
land, told the Senate Committee that "our position is that establish-
ment of compulsory arbitration, which would be established if the
Wagner bill is passed, would be against the interests of the workers."',
Eventually the sponsors of the Act agreed. Reporting a revised
version of the bill in 1935, the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor observed that "compulsory arbitration has not received the sanc-
tion of the American people,""5 adding:
[T] he duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to
reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining
is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made
to it are satisfactory."6
In signing the National Labor Relations Act into law, President Frank-
lin Roosevelt said exactly the reverse of what Senator Wagner had said
when first introducing it: "The National Labor Relations Board will
be an independent quasi-judicial body. It should be dearly understood
that it will not act as mediator or conciliator in labor disputes."5 7 And
in upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court re-
peated in Jones & Laughlin:
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and em-
ployees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. . . . The
theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with ac-
credited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial
peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which
the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.5 8
53 S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGiSLATIVE HIsTORY 1935,
at 10.
54 Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt 1, at 488 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGiSLATIVE HIsToRY 1935, at 522.
55 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY 1935, at 2307.
s6 Id. at 12, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, at 2312.
57 79 CONG. REc. 10,720 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, at 3269.
58 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). One should hasten
to add that the rejection of arbitration did not signify any weakening of the Congres-
sional desire to prevent strikes. On the contrary, it is clear that the impetus to pass the
National Labor Relations Act waxed and waned in intensity in direct correlation with
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In addition to section 7, section 13, and this rejection of arbitra-
tion, the National Labor Relations Act protected the right to strike by
defiining the "employees" protected by the Act so as to include workers
on strike." Responding in 1939 to the first wave of proposals for
restrictive amendments of the National Labor Relations Act, Senator
Wagner had this to say about the right to strike:
[T]he amendments proposed by Senator Burke would have the
effect, among other things, of placing restraints upon the right to
strike. No such proposal can strengthen or improve the Labor
Act because it is antagonistic to the whole spirit and purpose of the
law. The spirit and purpose of the law is to create a free and
dignified workingman who had the economic strength to bargain
collectively with a free and dignified employer in accordance with
the methods of democracy. The abolition or curtailment of the
right to strike is a denial of the principles of democracy and a sub-
stitution of the methods of the authoritarian state. The design of
the National Labor Relations Act is to reduce the nwnber of strikes
by eliminating the main wrongs and injustices that cause strikes.
The imposition of legal restrictions upon the right to strike, in-
stead of removing these wrongs, would merely deprive the worker
of his inalienable right to protest against them.60
Peaceful picketing, it is clear, was also expressly designated for
protection by section 7. Congressman Connery, sponsor of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in the House, and Sen-Ator Wagner, each
had something personal to say about peaceful picketing. On May 29,
1934, Congressman Connery told his colleagues how he himself "was
arrested for picketing on the East Side when we of the actors' union
were picketing the Avenue B Theater.""el Senator Wagner's experience
with picketing was from the other side of the bench. On May 16, 1935,
he rose to oppose an amendment to section 7 which would have added
the waxing and waning of the strike wave of 1934-35. See J. F UTHMACHER, SENATOR
ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN LIERALIsIm 166, 190 (1968); I. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 50, at 71, 76-77. The point, rather, is that Congress became convinced that
many strikes were caused by the refusal of management to recognize unions and to bar-
gain collectively, that collective bargaining requires the freedom to strike in the event of
an impasse, and hence, that the right to strike must be preservtd in order to prevent
strikes. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, supra note 55, at 2, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY 1935, at 2301: "[O]f the 6,355 new cases received by the r.gional agencies of the
present National Labor Relations Board during the second half of 1934, the issue of col-
lective bargaining was paramount in 2,330. .. ."
1-0 See S. REP. No. 573, supra note 55, at 6-7, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1935, at 2306: "[T]o hold that a worker who because of an ut' air labor practice has
been discharged or locked out or gone on strike is no longer an employee, would be to
give legal sanction to an illegal act and to deny redress to the indhiidual injured thereby."
110 THE WAGNER Acr: AFTER TEN YEARs 31 (L. Silverberg ed. 1945).
G1 78 CONG. REc. 9888 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIS JORY 1935, at 1152.
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the words "free from coercion or intimidation from any source."8 2
The Senator stated that the word "coercion" had in the past been
made use of by judges to enjoin peaceful picketing.
When I was a judge [the Senator continued] I issued such
injunctions myself. But how has the word "coercion" as among
employees been interpreted by the courts? The use of pickets,
mere persuasion without any force, threats, or intimidation, has
been deemed coercion . . . .6 Even peaceful persuasion by
picketing was regarded in some jurisdictions as a coercive method
employed by labor against the employer. 6
The amendment was defeated, 50-2l.5
In sum, then, the words "concerted activities for . mutual aid
or protection" were used in the Norris-La Guardia and National Labor
Relations Acts with the intent of shielding activities like strikes and
peaceful picketing from court orders and employer retaliation; these
activities were to be protected whether undertaken by one person or
by many; and the rights thus recognized were felt to be fundamental
rights, akin to the rights protected by the first amendment, and so
deserving of protection for their own sake.
II. THE MEANING OF MAJORITY RULE
Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the
employees elect that course, is the principle of majority rule ...
"The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power
to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power
vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all
employees."6
This, then, brings us to the question of how section 9 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was conceived to qualify or limit section 7.
Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act declares that represen-
tatives selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in such unit "for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment .... ."'I In the Act as en-
62 79 CONG. REc 7653 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 1935, at 2357.
68 Id. at 7654, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, at 2358.
64 Id. at 7670, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 1935, at 2386.
65 Id. at 7675, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, at 2399-2400.
88 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62-63
(1975), quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
6729 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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acted in 1935 there followed a proviso, stating: "That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer." '68
The legislative history makes clear that what was feared in 1935
was not the adjustment of grievances by individuals and small groups
after the adoption of a collective bargaining agrcement covering all
employees in an appropriate unit. Such adjustment was expressly an-
ticipated and welcomed by the proviso to section 9(a). Instead, what
was feared was that minorities, organized in company unions, would
be permitted to negotiate their own basic agreements side-by-side with
the agreement negotiated by the representative of the majority.69
The difference can be illustrated by an analogy often used at the
time and later. In section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, Con-
gress saw fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers com-
parable to those possessed by a legislative body. The intent of section
9, then, was to ensure that there would be only one legislature for a
given unit. The employer could not be expected to negotiate with more
than one set of representatives as to the "basic subjects of collective
bargaining." There must not be "two or more basic agreements."
"[T]here must be one basic scale, and it must apply to all."7
But this in no way signified opposition to a less exclusive "judicial"
process for adjusting grievances. On the contrary, not only might any
individual or group of employees at any time preseat grievances to the
employer, but also, said the House Committee, "the majority rule does
not preclude adjustment in individual cases of matters outside the scope
of the basic agreement."71
Senator Wagner and his colleagues affirmed the foregoing inter-
pretation of section 9 again and again. In 1934, Senator 'Wagner ap-
provingly quoted a letter to the New York Time,- which stated that
the role played by majority representatives "shall in no case prevent
the minority from having the right to discuss any grievance it may
have with the management." 72  Similarly Senator Walsh, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, stated in 1934:
There is nothing in this provision, or any other provision of
68 Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 453. But cf. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
69 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-2) (1935), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIV HIsTORY 1935, at 2974-76.
70 Id. at 18, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, at 2974.
71 Id. at 19, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 1935, at 2975. For subsequent cita-
tion of this passage by the National Labor Relations Board as a guide to the interpre-
tation of the proviso to section 9(a), see note 88 infra & text accompanying.
72 1 LFGISLATIm HISTORY 1935, at 1185.
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the act, which prohibits an employer from discussing grievances with
any employee or groups of employees at any time, irrespective of
the duly chosen representatives of the majority. Thus an employer
before agreeing or in agreeing to any settlement of grievances
presented by the duly chosen representatives of a majority of his
employees may receive the views of these representatives of the
minority.73
In the hearings on the revised 1935 bill, Senator Wagner continued
to explain that majority rule still "preserves at all times the right of any
individual or minority group to present grievances to their employer
through representatives of their own choosing. ' 7' He and other sponsors
of the bill cited President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order of
June 28, 1934, creating a National Steel Labor Relations Board, which
stated that majority rule was to be applied "without denying to any
employee or groups of employees the right to present grievances, to
confer with their employers, or to associate themselves and act for
mutual aid or protection. '75
As in the Executive Order, the right to present grievances was
linked to the right to engage in concerted activity. On the eve of the
Senate's final vote on the bill, Senator Walsh asserted that the minority's
right -to present grievances by implication required the minority's right
to strike:
MR. WALSH. Mr. President, under this bill representatives
chosen by a majority of the workers in a particular unit are rec-
ognized as entitled to represent the workers in that unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining with the employer, following a
similar provision in. the Railway Labor Act. It would be obviously
impracticable to have two collective agreements, with differing
terms as to wages and conditions of employment, covering the
same categories of workers in an appropriate unit. Who, then,
should represent the employees in negotiating the agreement?
Obviously, the representatives chosen by the majority of the
workers in the unit affected, in accordance with democratic princi-
ples; otherwise the employer will be enable [sic] to profit by
781d. at 1126. Note the phrase, "representatives of the minority." Early drafts of
the Act embodied this concept, e.g., S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced in February
1935, in which the proviso to section 9(a) read: "Provided, That any individual em-
ployee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer through representatives of their own choosing," 1 LEGISLATiVE HIsToRY
1935, at 1300. See also S. RE'. No. 1184, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1
LaGISLATIVE HisToR 1935, at 1108: "[T]he minority have a right through representa-
tives or otherwise to present grievances to their employer." This was in accord with the
practice of the railroad industry. See note 94 infra.
74 1 LE.is.ATinV HisToRy 1935, at 1420.
75 Id. at 1525-26.
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exploiting a division in the ranks of the workers, by playing off
one group against another in the negotiations, and thus defeating
true collective bargaining. Minority groups and individuals are
permitted by the bill to present grievances to the employer. But
any agreemnt arrived at with the majority representatives neces-
sarily is applicable to all the workers in the unit. If a dissenting
minority do not like the ternms of the agreement, there is nothing
in the bill which prevents the minority from quitting or striking.
MR. HASTINGS. Will the senator be good enough to tell
me what section that is?
MR. WALSH. It is the theory of the whole bill.76
In general, supporters of the National Labor Relations Act shared
the belief that the Act would permit individuals and groups to adjust
grievances with the employer so long as the adjustment was consistent
with the collective bargaining agreement. President William Green of
the American Federation of Labor summed up the consensus at the
House committee hearings. "Any worker has a right to present a
grievance . . . . [A] minority group may present grievances to the
management for adjustment. But . . . there must be established one
Y277bargaining agency ....
III. THE INTENDMENT OF THE PROVISO
The intendment of the proviso [to section 9(a)] is to permit em-
ployees to present grievances and to authorize the employer to
entertain them without opening itself to liability for dealing directly
with employees in derogation of the duty to bargain only with
the exclusive bargaining representative, a violation of § 8(a) (5) .78
It is, then, a considerable overstatement to say 1hat when the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was first enacted in i1935, the Act "was
not concerned, except incidentally, with what took place after the
proper union had been recognized by the employer . . . ."" On the
contrary, there was intense concern with what would happen to indi-
viduals and minorities after union recognition, and the proviso to sec-
tion 9(a) was enacted in response.
What is true is that the problems which first presented themselves
under the Act were problems connected with organizing for recogni-
76 2 Id. at 2390 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 2680. See, to the same effect, the testimony of Dr. William M. Leiserson,
Chairman of the National Mediation Board, in id. at 2262.
78 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61 n.12
(1975).
7 Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargainng by the NLRB, 63 HAv. L.
Rnv. 389 (1950).
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tion. An authoritative National Labor Relations Board publication
stated in 1940: "No occasions have as yet been presented to the board
affirmatively to sketch out the rights of minorities under the act where
a majority representation exists.""
By 1947, when Congress amended the Act, two traditions of
interpretation had begun to take shape. One stressed contract observance
and arbitration. During World War II, union-authorized strikes largely
ceased, and "the system of grievance arbitration as we now know it
was created."" In that atmosphere the assumption grew that the princi-
pal objective of the Act was labor peace. A body of Board and court
precedent developed accordingly. The sponsors of H.R. 3020, the
kernel of what became the Taft-Hartley Act, drew on decisions uphold-
ing the discharge of sit-down strikers, mutineers, "wildcat" strikers,
strikers in violation' of collective bargaining agreements, and mass
picketers, among others."2
A second theme of the 1947 amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, however, was the concern to protect the rights of in-
dividual employees. To begin with, this concern was expressed by the
Congressmen opposed to restrictions on concerted activity. Congress-
man John F. Kennedy, for instance, signed a minority report of the
House Committee on Education and Labor which, echoing the Supreme
Court in Jones & Laughlin, twice characterized the right to engage in
concerted activity as a "natural right.""
80 J. RoSENFAaB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKS 228-29 (1940).
81 Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663, 747 (1973).
82 H.R. 3020 included a new section 12, later deleted, which withdrew protection
from a long list of concerted activities. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act, 1947, at 204-07 (1947) [hereinafter cited as LEGIsLAvE
HISTORY 1947]. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-19 (1947) ; H.R. REP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Conference Committee), id. at 542-43, citing de-
cisions such as NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), and NLRB
v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944), from which the list of proscribed activities
was purportedly derived.
88H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (minority report), 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1947, at 355-403 (signed by Congressmen Lesinski, Kelley, Powell, Madden,
Klein, and Kennedy) stated:
In section 7 the [proposed] bill purports to guarantee to employees the right
of self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, and to bargain
collectively with representatives of their own choosing or "to refrain from any
and all such activity." This fundamental right is not dependent upon legislative
enactment. It is a natural right that exists and existed prior to passage and
independent of the National Labor Relations Act. . . Governmental protec-
tion of the natural right of working people to associate to protect their interests
was . . . necessary to convert that natural right into an effective one ....
There is no demonstrable need that this fundamental guarantee needs compro-
mise in the manner proposed by the bill. Especially is this true when the nega-
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But in addition, there was majority support for amendments to
enhance the rights of the individual, both as an employee on the shop
floor and as a union member. Congressman Hartley called his proposals
along these lines a "Bill of Rights."84 Some of these proposals were
deferred until the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, but
others were adopted. One of the two most important amendments
adopted protected an employee from discharge if union membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. The
other strengthened what Congressman Hartley termed the employee's
"right to present his own grievance to the employer should the union
refuse to do so."" This last was the amendment which strengthened
the proviso to section 9(a) by adding to the language enacted in 1935,
which protected the right to present grievances, the words: "and to
have such grievances adjusted.""6
To this documentary one should contrast the Supreme Court's
version of the legislative history of the 1947 amendment of section
9(a), in Emporium Capwell, which reads in full:
five provisions are considered in conjunction with section 2(1), 7(b), and 8(b)
which in their totality render organizational activities a ha:.ardous pursuit and
collective bargaining a sham.
Id. at 366-67.
841 LEGISLATV HIsTORY 1947, at 616. H.R. 3020 contained numerous proposals
which became part of the Landrum-Griffin Act, such as a requirement that union officers
stand for election at least once every four years, and a requirement that unions keep ade-
quate financial records and report thereon annually to each mem er. 1 LEGISLATVE His-
ToRY 1947, at 182-83. Congressman Hartley itemized the bill of rights contained in H.R.
3020 in a speech on April 15, 1947, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HTSTORY 1947, at 616. He
also itemized, in a subsequent book, the bill of rights contained in the Taft-Hartley Act
as finally enacted. F. HARTLEY, JR., OuR NENW NATIONAL LAE,)R POLICY: THE TAFT-
HARTLEY Acr AND THE NEXT STEPS 113-14 (1948).8s F. HARTLEY, supra note 84, at 114. See also Congressman Hartley's discussion of
the amended proviso to section 9 (a) in id. at 83:
Permission for individual employees to discuss their grie\ ances directly with
the employer and to adjust their grievances without the sanction of union repre-
sentatives had long been thought a means of eliminating one of the greatest
sources of internal discord, viz., the "playing of favorites" by union leaders ....
86 Section 9(a) as originally enacted in 1935 ended with the words ". . . present
grievances to their employer." Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 453. The 1947
amendments made no changes in what had already been enacted 3nd added the following
words:
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the interventicn of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
That the bargaining representative has been given opportun~ty to be present at
such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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The intendment of the proviso is to permit employees to present
grievances and to authorize the employer to entertain them without
opening itself to liability for dealing directly with employees in
derogation of the duty to bargain only with the exclusive bargain-
ing representative, a violation of § 8(a) (5). H.R. Rep. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1947) ; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947). The Act nowhere protects this "right"
by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to entertain such a presentation, nor can it be read to authorize
resort to economic coercion. This matter is fully explicated in
Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (CA 2 1962) Y
This mini-history fails to consider decisions of the Supreme Court it-
self which created the context for the 1947 amendment; wrongly sum-
marizes the congressional sources it cites; omits other, equally important
sources; and relies on a circuit court decision in which the treatment
of the legislative history is, if anything, worse.
In 1940, when the National Labor Relations Board stated that it
had not yet determined the rights of minorities under the Act after
union recognition, the author added: "Perhaps some inkling as to
these rights.is given by the House Report on the bill ... : '... the
majority rule does not preclude adjustment in individual cases of
matters outside the scope of the basic agreement.' "88
The suggestion that the Act left individuals free to adjust for
themselves matters outside the scope of the collective bargaining agree-
ment reflected the thinking of the Supreme Court. On at least six oc-
casions between the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act and
its amendment by the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court directly or in-
directly interpreted the intent of section 9(a). These decisions em-
phasized that in negotiating the collective bargaining agreement the
representative chosen by a majority of the workers affected must be
the exclusive representative."8 But the Court also left room for in-
dividual workers to act on their own behalf during the period between
contract negotiations. Interpreting analogous provisions of the Rail-
way Labor Act in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
the Court held that they
must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts, gen-
erally applicable to employees in the mechanical department, with
87420 U.S. at 61 n.12.
88 J. ROSENFARB, supra note 80, at 229. The quotation is from H.R. REP. No. 972,
sutpra note 69, at 19.
89 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Order of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944); Medo Photo Sup-
ply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
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any representative other than respondent [unioli], but not as
precluding such individual contracts as petitioner [employer] may
elect to make directly with individual employeesY'
Again, in J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,"' the Court
offered the intriguing model of the collective bargaining contract as
the creation of minimums. Individual contracts could not fall below the
minimums, but could exceed them.
Individual contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and
whether under some circumstances they may add to them in matters
covered by the collective bargain, we leave to be determined by
appropriate forums under the laws of contracts applicable, and to
the Labor Board if they constitute unfair labor practices.
It also is urged that such individual contracts may embody
matters that are not necessarily included within the statutory
scope of collective bargaining, such as stock purchase, group in-
surance, hospitalization, or medical attention. We know of nothing
to prevent the employee's, because he is an employee, making any
contract provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement
or does not amount to or result from or is not part of an unfair
labor practice. But in so doing the employer may not incidentally
exact or obtain any diminution of his own obligation or any in-
crease of those of employees in the matters covered by collective
agreement.12
Finally, in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley,93 the Court
described "collective bargaining" as "the formation of collective agree-
ments or efforts to secure them," as distinguished from a "grievance,"
which "contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already
concluded" and "relates either to the meaning or proper application of
a particular provision .
The Elgin case is particularly important. Congress referred to
it in debating the amendment of the proviso to section 9(a) in 1947."
9o Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 549 (1937). In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1937), the Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of Virginian Railway was also the proper interpretation of section 9(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act.
91321 U.S. 332 (1944).
92 J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
93 325 U.S. 711 (1945).94 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). The development of
the practice whereby individual railroad workers, or representatives chosen by them for
the occasion, process grievances, is described in Schreiber, The Origin of the Majority
Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to Protect the Minority: A
Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25 RUTGERs L. REv. 237, 244-45, 287-96 (1971).
95 See text accompanying note 116 infra; Comment, Individ 4al Employee Grievances
Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 154, 166 (1949) ; Dunau,
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In Elgin, moreover, the Court appears to have discussed more thoroughly
than at any time before or since the difference between the union's role
in collective bargaining and the union's role in grievance adjustment.
The Court's citation in Elgin to cases under the National Labor Re-
lations Act makes it quite clear that the discussion was not intended to be
confined to the Railway Labor Act.
Under the Railway Labor Act, the Court began, "[t]he statute
itself vests exclusive authority to negotiate and to conclude agree-
ments concerning major disputes in the duly selected collective agent."
But "[w]hether or not the agent's exclusive power extends also to the
settlement of grievances . . . presents more difficult questions. The
statute does not expressly so declare. Nor does it explicitly exclude
these functions."98
The union in Elgin took the position that the statute confers upon
the collective agent "the same exclusive power to deal with grievances"
as to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement."
The Court rejected this position. An individual employee's right
to confer with management about his own grievance is a "fundamental"
right.98 Therefore, the presumption should be that this right was in-
tended to continue after union recognition. The burden is on whoever
would contend that Congress intended
to submerge wholly the individual and minority interests, with all
power to act concerning them, in the collective interest and agency,
not only in forming the contracts which govern their employment
relation, but also in giving effect to them and to all other incidents
of that relation. Acceptance of such a view would require the
clearest expression of purpose. For this would mean that Con-
gress had nullified all preexisting rights of workers to act in
relation to their employment, including perhaps even the funda-
mental right to consult with one's employer, except as the collective
agent might permit. Apart from questions of validity, the con-
clusion that Congress intended such consequences could be accepted
only if it were clear that no other construction would achieve the
statutory aims.99
Thus the Court rejected what I have termed the Extinctioni Theory.
Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLUM. L.
REv. 731, 745 (1950).
90 325 U.S. at 728-29.
97 Id. at 733.
98 Id. at 734 ("the fundamental right to consult with one's employer"). See also id.
at 735 ("the individual employee's right to confer with the management about his own
grievance ...is .. .fundamental . . .
99 Id. at 733-34 (footnotes omitted).
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In contrast to its later view that union recognition extinguishes the
individual employee's power to order his own relations with his em-
ployer, the Court held in Elgin that Congress should not be presumed
to have intended that union recognition nullifies all pre-existing rights
of workers to act in relation to their employment.
Further, the Elgin decision specified two situations in which the
individual employee would be particularly damaged if the union could
settle his grievance without his consent.
[T]he drastic effects in curtailment of his preexisting rights to
act in such matters for his own protection would be most obvious
in two types of cases: one, where the grievance arises from in-
cidents of the employment not covered by a collective agreement,
in which presumably the collective interest would be affected only
remotely, if at all; the other, where the interest of an employee not
a member of the union and the collective interest, or that of the
union itself, are opposed or hostile.00
Finally, Elgin expressly left open the question "whether- Congress
intended to leave the settlement of grievances altogether to the individual
workers, excluding the collective agent entirely except as they may
specifically authorize it to act for them, or intended it also to have voice
in the settlement as representative of the collective interest."'
It will be evident how closely the 1947 additions to section 9(a)
followed the analysis of the Supreme Court decisions.
The amendment gives the employee the right not only to present
but to settle grievances, following Virginian Railway, J. I. Case, and
Elgin.
The amendment requires that any such adjustment be "not in-
consistent" with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agree-
ment then in effect, the very words used in J. I. Case.
The amendment permits the union to be present at the adjustment
but not to prevent it, along lines envisioned in Elgin.
The argument most strongly urged against a literal interpretation
of the proviso is that (in the words of the Court) the Act nowhere
protects the employee's right to present and adjust grievances by making
it an unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to entertain such
a presentation.1 2 The absence of a remedy, it is suggested, vitiates the
alleged right.
'100 Id. at 736.
101 Id. at 737.
102 The Court's current view is also that of the author in Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 601, 624 & n,49 (1956).
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This problem tends to arise with any right which is a "funda-
mental right. . not dependent upon legislative enactment." '  Because
the statute merely recognizes, or perhaps only implies the fundamental
right, the statute is unlikely to provide specific means for the right's
enforcement. In consequence, it can somewhat perversely be argued that
a fundamental right is not more of a right than a right created by
statute, but less of a right, because the fundamental right lacks any
method of enforcement. Unless the courts are prepared to fill the en-
forcement gap, the right, no matter how fundamental, may become just
a "right," abstract and unenforceable.
A year before Elgin, the Court confronted the enforcement prob-
lem in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,' and further
provided context for the 1947 amendment of section 9(a). In Steele,
the Court held that individuals and minorities have a right to be fairly
represented by any union on whom Congress confers the authority
of exclusive representation. But how was the right to be enforced? The
right was not clearly stated by a statute. Still less did the statute
prescribe remedies. What then was to be done? Precedents were divided.
In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway
& Steamship Clerks,"0 5 the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Hughes, held that the fundamental right to organize and bargain col-
lectively should be enforced by the courts even though the statute pro-
vided no penalty for its violation. But in Amalgamated Utility Workers
(C.I.O.) v. Consolidated Edison Co.,' Hughes declared for the Court
that individual workers might not initiate contempt actions for the en-
forcement of Board orders protecting their fundamental rights.
The Court in Steele followed Texas & New Orleans rather than
Amalgamated Utility Workers, and held that individual workers might
enforce their fundamental right to fair representation in the courts.
In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the
right here asserted . . . is of judicial cognizance. That right
would be sacrified or obliterated if it were without the remedy
which courts can give for breach of such a duty or obligation and
which it is their duty to give in cases in which they have jurisdic-
1o H. REP. No. 245, supra note 83.
104 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
105281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930):
The absence of penalty is not controlling. The creation of a legal right by
language suitable to that end does not require for its effectiveness the imposi-
tion of statutory penalties. Many rights are enforced for which no statutory
penalties are provided.
1 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
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tion .... The right is analogous to the ... right which this Court
has enforced and protected by its injunction in Texas & New
Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks . . . .1o7
In the context of Supreme Court decisions between 1935 and 1947,
then, there is every reason to believe that the 1947 amendment of the
proviso to section 9(a) was intended to confer additional, real rights
on individual employees. Certainly the National Labor Relations Board
so believed. Opposing the proposed amendment of the proviso, Chair-
man Herzog of the Board testified:
The proviso to section 9(a) is changed by S. 360 so that any
individual or group may not only present grievances to his employer
(which is entirely proper) but also "adjust such grievances, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, so long as the
adjustment does not violate the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect."
This proposed amendment to the proviso is a serious impinge-
ment on the authority of the exclusive bargaining; agent to act
for the whole unit. . . . It should be noted . . . that an
individual bargain on a grievance may affect all other employees,
even though it does not necessarily violate the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining contract. . . . The amendment would seriously
weaken the position of a duly selected bargaining agnt.0 8
The committee reports and debates which accompanied the amendment
of section 9(a) overwhelmingly confirm Chairman Herzog's interpre-
tation, and rebut the interpretation of the proviso by the Supreme
Court in Emporium Capwell.1 9
The first report cited by the Court in Emporium Capwell dis-
cusses the proviso to section 9(a) under the heading "Rights of
Workers," appropriately calling the rights "rights" and not "privileges."
This section of the report begins: "Important among the provisions
of the bill are those that really assure to workers freedom in their or-
ganizing and bargaining activities. The old act purported to do this,
but in the Board's hands it often had the opposite effect." 0
After discussing unit determination and the rights of union
107 323 U.S. at 207.
108 Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1914-15 (1947) (statfment of Paul M. Her-
zog).
z 09 The material which follows is for the most part not new. It is summarized in
the articles cited in note 95 supra; in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d
825 (1963); and in Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreernents and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962). Because the material continus to be ignored, I have
quoted rather fully.
110 H.R. RFy. No. 245, supra note 82, at 298.
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members to control the union's affairs, the report turns to- the amended
proviso to section 9 (a). About this the report states:
The bill further adds to the freedom of workers by permitting
them not only to present grievances to their employers, as the
old Board heretofore has permitted them to do, but also to settle
the grievances when doing so does not violate the terms of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement, which the Board has not allowed.1 1
The report also returns to the proviso to section 9(a) at a later
point:
Like the present act, this clause of the amended act would
make representatives chosen by the majority of the employees
in a bargaining unit the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The present
act provides that any individual employee or group of employees
may "present grievances to their employer." Putting a strange
construction upon this language, the Labor Board says that while
employees may "present" grievances in person, the representative
has the right to take over the grievances. The present bill permits
the employees and their employer to settle the grievances, but
only if the settlement is not inconsistent with the terms of any
collective-bargaining agreement than [sic] in effect. The proviso
is thus given its obvious and proper meaning .
Noteworthy here is that to the House Committee it was "obvious and
proper" that section 9(a) conferred a right, and that the right included
authority to settle grievances.
The other primary source cited by the Court in Emporium Cap-
well'" contains the same emphasis on a right to settle. By using "settle-
ment" and "adjustment" interchangeably, this report makes clear that
these terms have the same meaning."'
The obvious third primary source, not cited by the Court in
Emporium Capwell, is the report of the Senate Committee on the
counterpart bill in the Senate, S. 1126. This report would appear to
resolve all ambiguities as to legislative intent.
Section 9(a): The revisions of section 9 relating to rep-
resentation cases make a number of important changes in existing
law. An amendment contained in the revised proviso for section
9(a) clarifies the right of individual employees or groups of em-
ployees to present grievances. The Board has not given full effect
illId.
112 Id. at 325.
118420 U.S. 50 (1975).
11 H.P, REP. No. 510, mpra note 82, at 550.
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to this right as defined in the present statute since it has adopted
a doctrine that if there is a bargaining representative he must be
consulted at every stage of the grievance procedure, even though
the individual employee might prefer to exercise his right to
confer with his employer alone. The current Board practice
received some support from the courts in the Hvghes Tool case
. a decision which seems inconsistent with another circuit
court's reversal of the Board in NLRB v. North Anwrican Avia-
tion Company . ... The revised language -would make it
clear that the employee's right to present grievances exists in-
dependently of the rights of the bargaining representative, if
the bargaining representative has been given an opportunity to
be present at the adjustment, unless the adjustment is contrary
to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect.Y5
It need hardly be underscored that an individual right to present and
adjust grievances, existing "independently of the rights of the bar-
gaining representative," cannot be decided out of existence in the manner
of the Court in Emporium Capwell.
The Congressional debates supplement the three committee reports.
The most important statements in the congressional debates as to the
intention of the amended proviso to section 9(a) were by Congressmen
Owens, of Illinois, and Hartley.
MR. OWENS. Is it not a fact that under this provision we
have gone in accord with the decisions of the zSupreme Court
of the United States, which hold that where employees have a
grievance, for instance in connection with the recovzry of a certain
amount of money claimed due from an employer, they can go to him
and complain about it and settle it without having a bargaining
agent? We have not in this section 9(a) of the bill said any-
thing about wages, terms, conditions of employment, . . . but
we have specifically said it does not include the making of any
settlement inconsistent with the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement then in effect, that is, at the time of the discussion
and settlement.
MR. HARTLEY. The gentleman from Illinois is absolutely
correct in that statement. 116
The mini-legislative history in Emporium Capwell makes no re-
ference to the congressional debates. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in Black-Clawsoz,"7 relied on by the Supreme Court in
115 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY
1947, at 430.
11693 CONG. REc. 3703 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1947, at 781.
417 Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962).
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Emporium Capwell, quotes one sentence from the debates: a sentence
taken from a speech by Senator Murray in support of a substitute bill !"'
Virtually the entire legislative history of the amendment of the
proviso to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act in 1947 has
now been quoted. If legislative history is history as historians under-
stand it, the Supreme Court's account of the purpose behind the amended
proviso is misleading on all points. It is clear that Congress intended to
confer a right, not a "right." The intent of the amended proviso was
not to give employers the right to "entertain" grievances, but to give
individual employees and groups of employees the right to present and
settle them. Congress in enacting the amended proviso adopted the dis-
tinction between a collective bargaining agreement and a grievance, and
the union's appropriate roles therein, articulated by the Supreme Court
in Elgin and kindred cases.
There remain the Court's contentions in Emporium Capwell that
the proviso to section 9(a) contains no remedy, and that, in any case,
the right to present and adjust grievances does not "authorize resort to
economic coercion."
With regard to remedies: Congress intended at least that em-
ployer and employee should be free to settle grievances when the settle-
ment is consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, and the
union has been given an opportunity to be present. Surely, then, an
employer ought not to be able to discharge an employee who requests
to do just that."
With regard to coercion: The case for reasonable concerted activ-
is193 CONG. REc. 4904 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HisTORy 1947, at 1453,
quoted in Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 355, 313 F.2d
179, 185 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962).
119 Compare the following formulations along similar lines:
An individual employee has the right, under Section 9(a) of the Act, to present
his grievance individually . . . without the intervention of the union. Conse-
quently, he has the right to present to this Board, apart from and without being
limited by any grievance-arbitration process, alleged violations of the Act which
have impaired those rights of his which the Act protects.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R1B. 837, 852 (1971) (Jenldns, M., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted).
The reasoning behind the Miranda doctrine could be extended so as to make the
"right" of individual presentation pursuant to section 9(a) enforceable by the
NLRB and immune from elimination by the collective agreement or by the em-
ployer's policies.*
*Miranda read the duty of fair representation, inferred from section 9 of
the NLLRA, into the rights conferred by section 7 and enforced by section
8. ... Similar reasoning could be applied to the right of individual presentation
of grievances expressly recognized in section 9(a).
Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Rem-
edies, the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 40 & n.187 (1974).
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ity in support of section 9(a) grievance settlement has already been
sketched. 2' The venerable epithet "coercion" does not weaken it. The
Court itself recently said of peaceful picketing:
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise
a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from
the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended
to influence respondent's conduct by their activit es; this is not
fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper....
Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the
public aware of respondent's real estate practices. Those practices
were offensive to them, as the views and practices of petitioners
are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are
peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of accept-
ability.' 21
No obvious reason appears why peaceful concerted activity about work-
place conditions should be held to a higher standard than similar
activity about real estate practices.' If the request to present and
settle grievances is protected-as the legislative history mandates-
then reasonable concerted activity in support thereof should be pro-
tected, also.
IV. CONCLUSION: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN T'HE WORKPLACE
Here, it is like, the common question will be made: "Who shall
be judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their
trust?" . . . To this I reply: The people shall be judge; for
2o See note 19 supra.
121 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
122 If the objection to the picketing in Emporium Capwell on section 9 grounds is set
aside, the activity itself was clearly protected as solicitation in nouworking hours and off
the company property under Republic Aviation, see note 4 supra & text accompanying,
not to speak of the fact that the Emporium is a department store open to the public, cf.
Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) ; cf. also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1974). Further, if the dis-
tribution of literature as to the adequacy of the bargaining representative requires par-
ticular protection, that protection might well extend to distribut on of literature which
would not occur but for a belief in the representative's inadequa.:y. Perhaps the Court
felt justified in ignoring the first amendment dimension of Emporium Capwell because
the picketers distributed abusive leaflets which called the employe!r, among other things,
a "racist pig." However, even assuming arguendo that some literature can be so "dis-
loyal" and "indefensible" as to justify discharge, NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S.
464 (1953), that doctrine is not triggered when the "attempt to .olicit through publicity
. .. customers' support-moral or economic-for the labor dispute objectives" is con-
ducted in such a way that (1) the labor dispute basis of the appeal is apparent, (2) there
is no disparagement of the employer's product, and (3) the content of the literature does
not materially depart from minimal standards of truthfulness. NLRB v. National Furni-
ture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280, 284, 286 (7th Cir. 1963). Accord, Red Top Cab & Baggage
Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1433, 1450 (1964). The literature distributed in Emporium Capwell
met at least the first two tests.
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who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well and
according to the trust reposed in him but he who deputes him
and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard
him when he fails in his trust ?128
Contrary to the legislative history of the Supreme Court, the
more recent labor statutes promote not one national labor policy, but
two: minimizing industrial strife through contract observance and
arbitration, and protecting individual rights.
These policies have not been satisfactorily accomodated. One in-
dication of this is that Justice Douglas, spokesman for the arbitration
policy in Lincoln Mills124 and in the Steelworkers Trilogy, 25 has been
calling for that policy's restriction in cases which involve conflict be-
tween the union and its individual members.
Justice Douglas early noted the Landrum-Griffin Act and its con-
cern for individual rights in the Borden case."' Borden, a plumber,
sued for damages in state court charging that his union had wrong-
fully failed to refer him to a job. The defendant union challenged the
state court's jurisdiction on preemption grounds, and the Supreme
Court, with the exception of Justices Douglas and Clark, agreed.
Douglas stated for the dissenters:
As a matter of policy, there is much to be said for allowing the
individual employee recourse to conventional litigation in his
home-town tribunal for redress of grievances. . . . When the
basic dispute is between a union and an employer, any hiatus that
might exist in the jurisdictional balance that has been struck can
be filled by resort to economic power. But when the union member
has a dispute with his union, he has no power on which to rely.'2 7
Justice Douglas challenged the arbitration policy itself, on similar
grounds, in 1971. United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles2 1
involved a seaman who sued for lost wages. The district court gave
summary judgment for the employer, holding under Lincoln Mills that
the employee must use the grievance-arbitration machinery provided
128 j. Locxz, SEcoND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 240 (1966).
124 Textile Workers' Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
125 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise "Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
1
2
6 Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690,
698 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 699-700. Justice Douglas quoted the last two sentences in his dissent in the
similar case of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274, 305 (1971).
128400 U.S. 351 (1971).
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in the collective bargaining agreement before going to court. A 5-4
decision by the Supreme Court affirmed a reversal by the court of
appeals. Douglas wrote for the Court: "The question here is not
the continuing validity of Lincoln Mills and its progeny," 1 but in fact,
as the minority insisted, the Douglas opinion partially repudiated the
pro-arbitration policy. The Court professed to affirm because seamen,
unlike other workers, have a separate statutory remedy which predates
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Douglas, how-
ever, added these words about legislative history:
Enforcement by or against labor unions was the main burden of
§ 301, though standing by individual employees to secure declara-
tions of their legal rights under the collective agreement was
recognized. . . . Since the emphasis was on suit3 by unions and
against unions, little attention was given to the assertion of claims
by individual employees . 1...230
Once having distinguished the situation of the individual employee
as a situation calling for systematic special treatment, Justice Douglas
began to find constitutional overtones in the individual employee's
plight. In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,"8 the
plaintiff was a railroad worker who, having been discharged, sought
not to be reinstated but to collect certain monies due. Dissenting alone,
Justice Douglas contended that while the claim, as in Arguelles, argu-
ably fell under the collective bargaining agreement, the employee
should be free, as in Arguelles, to seek a remedy in court if he chose.
Justice Douglas reached the constitutional issue with these words:
Everyone who joins a union does not give up his civil rights.
If he wants to leave the commune and assert his common-law
rights, I had supposed that no one could stop him. I think it
important under our constitutional regime to leave as much in-
itiative as possible to the individual. What the Court does today
is ruthlessly to regiment a worker and force him to sacrifice his
constitutional rights in favor of a union . .132
121)Id. at 352.
1o Id. at 355-56.
13140 U.S. 320 (1972).
132Id. at 330-31. The argument that the pro-arbitration policy deprives workers of
a constitutionally protected right to sue was first made by Justic. Black's dissent in Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 663 (1965). In Andrews justice Douglas
disavowed the decision in Maddox. It is noteworthy that Maddox, like Lockridge, Ar-
guelles, and Andrews, was a former employee, hence arguably less precluded by the col-
lective bargaining agreement than one presently working under it. A majority of the
Court found this reasoning persuasive in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America,
Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), which held that
an employer might unilaterally modify retirees' benefits without diolating its duty to bar-
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Justice Douglas was again the solitary dissenter in the critical
Gateway and Emporium Capwell cases. In Gateway, the Justice not
only argued the existence of another exception to the presumption of
arbitrability, the safety-and-health exception, but rested his dissent on
natural right grounds. The words of section 502 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, stated Justice Douglas, "recognize in the law
what is in any case an unavoidable principle of human behavior:
self preservation. As Judge Hastie said for the majority in the Court of
Appeals: 'Men are not wont to submit matters of life or death to
arbitration. . . ." "" And in Emporium Capwell, gathering the fruits
of repentance embodied in all these opinions, Justice Douglas twice in a
brief dissent declared that the Court had made the individual worker a
"prisoner of the union.
Justice Douglas' dissents in Gateway and Emporium Capwell bring
him full circle from the position he espoused as the Court's spokesman
for arbitration. In these dissents, he goes beyond the assertion that
an individual employee must have access to a court, rather than to an
arbitrator, should the individual choose that forum. Here he asserts
that individual employees must be free to strike if they believe their
lives to be in danger, or to picket it they see no other way of ending
their employer's alleged racial discrimination. In effect, Justice Douglas
in his Gateway and Emporium Capwell dissents puts forward the posi-
tion that a worker should be able to choose, not merely between an
arbitrator and a court, but between any third party decisionmaker and
direct action. Thereby Douglas calls into question the inarticulate major
premise of the Supreme Court's recent labor decisions: that the highest
of all goods is to get the workers off the streets, or the shop floor,
and into the chambers of some purportedly neutral umpire. Justice
Douglas' voice serves to keep alive for the Court the choice which Con-
gress left open between labor peace at the expense of individual liberty,
and individual liberty at the risk of labor peace.
The Court has attempted to accomodate the competing congres-
sional policies of arbitration on the one hand, and individual liberty
on the other, by a doctrine of collective rights.
There are, the Court appears to be saying, two kinds of rights in
gain. The Court observed that it could not be assumed "that collective bargaining over
the benefits of already retired employees would be a one-way street in their favor,"
cryptically citing the Elgin case and section 9(a). Id. at 173 n.12.
88 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 391-92 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
'34 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 73, 76
(1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the workplace.13 First there are individual rights, like an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.13 Rights of this kind cannot be bargained away
by the union. Presumably an employee might wive his or her op-
portunity to pursue these individual rights in court as part of a volun-
tary settlement. The effectiveness of any such waiver would depend
on whether the employee's consent to the settlement was voluntary and
knowing. To use an old-fashioned word, these rights are "inalien-
able.' 3 7
Then, as the Court visualizes the statutory scheme, there are col-
lective rights protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act. They are conferred on employees collectively to foster the pro-
cesses of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by
the union. They are protected not for their own sake but as an in-
strument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife.
Waiver of these collective rights is liberally construed. The principle of
majority rule prevails. It is inevitable that some individuals and groups
will be subordinated to the interest of the majority. The complete sat-
isfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. Thus in
the eyes of the Court, section 7 rights are not really rights belonging
to an individual, like other rights. They are quasi-rights, almost privi-
leges.
The doctrine that the rights to concerted activity are collective
rights corresponds neither to legislative history nor to much case law.
The Supreme Court itself recently decided that an individual's right
to have a union representative present at an interview which might
reasonably be expected to lead to discipline was an aspect of the right
to concerted activity. 8' It is settled law that an individual's action is
often protected concerted activity.' The rights to leaflet, to picket,
185 The following two paragraphs follow almost verbatim the language of Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and Emporium Capnvell.
13842 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970).
2a7 In the eighteenth century, an "inalienable right" was ,ither (a) a right which
could be given up only by consent of its possessor or (b) a right so inextricably a part
of human nature that it could not be given up at all. See S. LYND, INTELLECrUAL ORI-
GINS oF AmEICAN RADIcAI sm ch. 2 (1968).138 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
239 A single employee, attempting in good faith to enforce a right claimed under a
collective bargaining agreement, is engaging in protected concerted activity and may not
be discharged. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). Al-
ternatively, a single employee is engaged in protected concerted activity if the employee's
activity has the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or has some
relation to group action in the interests of the employees. Mushroom Transp. Co. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
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and to strike are rights which individuals possess like any other rights.
One may compare such individually-possessed rights to concerted ac-
tivity to the rights peaceably to assemble, and to petition for the redress
of grievances, protected by the first amendment. Justice Douglas had
something like this in mind when he stated in Andrews that the plaintiff
was petitioning the government under the first amendment "'for a
redress of grievances' in the traditional manner of suitors at common
law."'40 From the standpoint of their respective legislative histories,
moreover, section 7 rights are every bit as real, as fundamental, as
statutorily-blessed, as individually-owned, and as insusceptible to vicari-
ous waiver, as Title VII rights.
Equally unpersuasive is the companion doctrine which protects the
right to engage in concerted activities without the union's approval only
when that activity supports union objectives.'4 Surely the need for
unauthorized activity is greatest precisely when the union and its dis-
sidents are not in harmony.
When a union rejects a claim . . . it can scarcely be expected
to use the most efficacious means of remedying it. Self-help in
those circumstances would appear to be more deserving of statutory
protection than in the case where the union is taking reasonable
curative action. 14
2
Citizens of the larger society would presumably find intQlerable a law
permitting only public speeches certified as patriotic, or picketing only
when the picket signs express confidence in the government. Yet what
seems bizarre in the context of the world outside the workplace has
come to seem to the majority of the Court quite proper after punching
in.
Strikingly in contrast is the approach of the National Labor
Relations Board when considering whether to defer to arbitration a
matter which is arguably both a contract violation and an unfair labor
practice. Unfair labor practice charges filed by individual employees will
140 Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 331 (1972).
141 This doctrine was developed by the National Labor Relations Board and by some
of the circuit courts of appeal to soften the harshness of the view that, after union
recognition, any section 7 activity unauthorized by the union is presumptively unprotected.
It is summarized as follows by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals:
One approach has been to protect minority concerted activity, such as walkouts
or picketing, whenever it is not in derogation of the union's position on the mat-
ter in question, i. e., when the concerted activity supports the position taken by
the union. See, e. g., N. L. R. B. v. R. C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Western Contracting Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (foot-
note omitted).
142 Meltzer, supra note 119, at 36 n.172.
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be deferred to arbitration, according to the General Counsel, only if the
individuals' interests are in substantial harmony with the interests of
the union. Even where substantial harmony is found, the Board will
not defer if the individual expressly objects to or expressly refuses to
be bound by the arbitration of the dispute underlying the charge.14
The Board's approach presumes that section 7 rights are indeed
rights, belonging to individual employees, and so, like any other rights,
subject to the wishes of those employees as to the preferred manner of
their enforcement.
The case for presumptive protection of concerted activity, before
and after union recognition, can be summarized as follows:
1. The rights to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection were intended by the Congress to be fundamental rights,
akin to the rights protected by the first amendment. They are rights
which belong to each individual employee, and they protect activity such
as picketing and strikes whether undertaken singly or in concert. These
rights are protected for their own sake as well as for their instru-
mental function.
2. In establishing the principle that a representative chosen by a
majority of employees should be their collective bargaining repre-
sentative, Congress expressly reserved the right of individuals and
groups to adjust grievances directly with the employer. It was under-
stood that this right in turn required the freedom to take reasonable
concerted action.
3. The 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
strengthened, rather than weakened, this right of employees to deal
directly with their employer independently of the union.
4. Post-World War II labor statutes affirm the desirability of
contract observance and arbitration, but affirm no less strongly the
freedom of action of the individual employee. Thus there are two
recent labor policies, not one.
5. The Supreme Court should abandon its position that the selec-
tion of a bargaining representative extinguishes the individual em-
ployee's power to order his own relations with the employer. The Court's
present position squarely contradicts both the language of the proviso
143 Office of the General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Arbitration De-
ferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised Guidelines, May 10, 1973, at 32-36. Accord,
T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Atleson, Dis-
ciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 Bu2'F. L. REv. 355 (1971);
Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973);
Schatzki, A Response to Professor Getman, 49 IND. L.J. 76 (1973). Whether the Board
in fact adheres to these guidelines is another question, for another article.
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to section 9(a), and the legislative history.
6. Section 7 rights should be presumptively protected before and
after union recognition. Harmony between the individual member and
the union should not be a condition precedent for the exercise of sec-
tion 7 rights. On the contrary, precisely to the degree that harmony
does not exist, it may be the more necessary for rank-and-file workers
to take back into their own hands the rights which they have delegated.
